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HAKE: THE DISCUSSION REOPENS The
change of authorities and its consequences on the sphere of fisheries management,
although still partial, seems to have created a suitable framework to revitalize
the -for many reasons-ever latent debate on the management of the most important
and controversial fishery resource of the Argentinean sea: the hake. By
the close of this issue, the several business chambers with interests in this
fishery were convened at the Undersecretariat of Fisheries in order to compose a
kind of executive working table to debate the future of the fishery. Although
in the first meetings the questions to be raised and the outcomes are not likely
to be completely clear, the issues that will be expressly or tacitly dealt with
on that working table are the most controversial ones which have interfered, for
a long time, with an effective and rational management of this resource. Has the emergency status finished? The
first issue will be the recovery range of the stock located south of the 48º S
parallel, as well as the validity of the emergency scheme implemented in 1999
and ratified in 2000 by the 189/99 Decree. A first subtle advance against the
emergency decree validity has been made by the Federal Fisheries Council which,
for the first time in four years, has established the total allowable catch for
hake in 300,000 tons, ignoring that the emergency decree had removed it
temporarily from that function; this situation even casts doubt on the true
validity of this catch limit. Based
on this data, which increases fishing possibilities by 20 per cent in relation
to last year, the business chambers representing the interests of the sector
that operates processing vessels try to show that the emergency should be a
thing of the past, and demand the repeal of the 189/99 decree. In
an interesting speech delivered before the congress of the Argentine Industrial
Union by one of its most important references, the Hispanic-Argentinian Mario
Ordiales (see “The Agreement with the EU according to Ordiales”), that
figure was compared with the 220,000 tons caught by Namibia, “Argentina´s
main competitor in hake world markets”, as proof of stock health (see
“Namibia and Argentina”). However,
these positions are, unfortunately, still tinged with economic interest, which
is somewhat logical but, eventually, counterproductive in every sense, since it
is to be supposed that serious companies with long-term projections have to
handle true information, even though they dislike it. The
fact remains that there is nothing within the technical available information
that allows considering that the biological state of emergency of the hake
resource has been overcome, although it does allow considering that the recovery
process already implied in 2001continues. A still highly uncertain and unstable
process about which, at this very moment, fishermen are doubtful and, as a
result, extend their fishing trips up to 12 days in order to complete their
loads (see “Recovery Just Begins”). The
emergency repeal would entail the permit for the whole processing fleet to have
access to zones north of the 48º S parallel, where the greater abundance of
hake is, repeating in this way the scene that almost leads to the commercial
collapse of this species. Quota
System The
second issue, related to the first one but being of medium- term instead, refers
to this fishery management regime and, in the first place, to the discussion
about the individual quota system provided by the 24.922 Law. At
present, due to the slowness of the outgoing authorities, there exists a more
than precarious management regime, in which almost every article of the
Resolution in force, Nº 8/2002, has expired except for those related to the
prohibition against fishing hake and operating north of 48º S for processing
vessels. However, nowadays the ice chilling fishing fleet can fish without any
restriction, since the emergency non transferable quota per vessel regime is no
longer in force. As yet, the incoming authorities have not cared much about
removing this anomaly and strongly believe in the “executive working table”,
in which the key issue is called “quota system”. Even
if all the participants were willing to advance towards some quota allocation
process, the excessive overcapitalization of this fishery and the social
problems related to it represent major obstacles. Problems such as lack of
control or disgraceful control quality, along with the tendency towards under-declaration
and discard related to these systems –as pointed out by INIDEP (National
Institute for Fisheries Research & Development) last technical report on
hake-, constitute real danger for the health of the stock and its associated
ecosystem, as well as for the fishery adequate management. Moreover,
other problems will have to be taken into account, such as the permits
questioned by the already legendary Buenos Aires University audit, the situation
of the independent ship owners and fishermen who do not own plants on land,
coastal fleet particularities, and the future of vessels without adequate
permits who, all the same, have caught -and declared- hake, and whose claims to
this fishing were legally recognized on repeated occasions. Besides,
this took place without the existence of the necessary official definition of
fishery policies which consists, basically, in determining if the criterion to
be applied is the maximum social benefit stipulated by article 1 of the Federal
Fisheries Law, or if there will be an attempt to adopt an apparently
“neutral” process which, in fact, will favour the goals of the sector
operating processing vessels -mainly of Spanish origin-, and settled in
Patagonian ports. Even
though official manifestations are of “open-mindedness”, the geographical
origin of the fishery authority, and adviser Jorge Bridi’s background -who has
been inherited from two previous administrations-, seem to show that the present
authorities would prefer the second path mentioned above. However, shortly after
attempting to eventually follow it, they would verify how powerful the barriers
that would prevent such a developing process are. Nevertheless,
there are certain grounds for optimism. To start with, the sector operating
processing vessels starts to recognize that there was an unsustainable excessive
increase in that fleet size (see “The Agreement…”). This represents a new
and promising fact, beyond its contradictions, since it makes it possible to
think about special measures to reasonably reduce the number of processing
vessels. As
regards the ice chilling fishing fleet sector, those involved in it do not
refuse to discuss an eventual quota process as long as the historical rights of
their vessels and of each of their sub sectors are adequately taken into account,
imposing the necessary restrictions on both quota transfer and quota-holding
concentration. This
represents an essential basis for conversation, since it is internationally
recognized that a consensus among the people involved represents a fundamental
requisite for a quota system to be successful. Otherwise, it can lead directly
to a catastrophe. Basically,
it should be possible to think of the existence of five hake quota subsystems,
each holding a global quota. A first subsystem would be represented by the
processing vessel fleet, and their quotas –fully transferable- would be
allocated in accordance with the five criteria established by the law. It would
be worth thinking of some quota incentive as well as of extraction fees
discounts for those vessels transferring their permit to an ice chilling fishing
vessel, for the purpose of fulfilling the provisions of article 1 of the
Fisheries Law (see “Namibia…”). A
second subsystem would be represented by the ice chilling fishing vessels
related to on shore plants, in which case quotas would be allocated in
accordance with the five criteria established by the law, and their
transferability level would be agreed with the interested party. A
third subsystem would be represented by the ice chilling fishing vessels not
related to on shore plants. In this case, catch report would be the only
allocation criterion for quotas and its corresponding period could also be
agreed with the interested party. Quotas would not be transferable. A
fourth and provisional subsystem would be represented by those vessels not
having adequate permits, but possessing a declared fishery record instead. Once
the individual and global quotas are decided and the interested party agrees on
them, this subsystem would be added to the third subsystem of independent ship
owners. Finally,
a fifth subsystem would be comprised of coastal fleets to which a global quota
would be allocated. A
last provisional subsystem could consist of those vessels whose permits have
been questioned by Buenos Aires University audit. These vessels could be
allocated a provisional, non transferable quota, until their situation has been
definitively dealt with. It
is clear that on proposing this ideas we say a lot and, at the same time, we do
not say much, since the discussion should be about global quota allocation. We
shall sooner see to which extent it is possible to reach some consensus. The control The
third issue that should be
dealt with in the “working table” is the one related to monitoring and
control. If business strategies are sound and long-term ones, this issue cannot
be avoided and neither can the related problem regarding the trivial sum of
extraction fees, whose amounts are about of 0.7 per cent of fish dock value, an
absurdly low figure compared with the international standards and also with the
beginning of the system, which started at 2 per cent. If
this value is not updated by means of applying to it a factor ranging between at
least 2 and 2.15, it will be impossible to meet not only the needs of satellite
monitoring, on board observers, patrolling and inspectors, but also the most
complex needs of the state administrative structure. If this system does not
operate adequately, a quota system will simply be a paper system: the rapid path
to collapse. |
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